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Hill: Prison Law

PRISON LAW

CASEY v. LEWIS: THE LEGAL
BURDEN IS RAISED; THE
PHYSICAL BARRIER IS SPARED

.

SONG HILL

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Casey v. Lewis,l the Ninth Circuit held that a
prisoner's Fourteenth Amendment rights o( meaningful access to the courts are not violated when he 2 is prohibited
from contact visitation with his attorney under an Arizona
prison regulation. 3
* J.D. 1994, Golden Gate University School of Law.
Ms. Hill is a staff attorney with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not represent court
policy or the views of any of the judges.
The author wishes to thank Professor Joan Howarth for her valuable advice and
contributions. The author would also like to thank Mark Figueiredo, Maureen
McTague, Scott Baker, and the Law Review editorial staff at Golden Gate University
School of Law, for their assistance in preparing this article for publication.
1. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (opinion by Farris, J., joined
by Goodwin, J.; partial concurrence and partial dissent by Pregerson, J.).
2. The male and female pronouns will be used alternately throughout this
Note in reference to the prisoner.
3. The Arizona non-contact visitation policy provides that, "[t]he following
inmate population shall have non-contact visits: Special Management Unit,
Alhambra Reception Center, and inmates in lock down status or as designated by
the Warden." See Casey, 4 F.3d at 1526 n.l (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
A non-contact visit is a "visit between an inmate and his visitor that is
conducted without any physical contact and with a physical barrier between them."
1
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The Ninth Circuit requires prisoners to demonstrate the
unreasonableness of a prison regulation which infringes
upon their constitutional rights. 4 Further, the court approves an adequate law library as an alternative to attorney-client visits to satisfy a prisoner's Fourteenth Amendment rights of meaningful access to the courts,5 discounting
counsel's indispensable services to a prisoner. 6
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Prisoners housed at certain Arizona Department of
Corrections (hereinafter "ADOC") facilities are barred from
contact visits with their attorneys under an ADOC policy.7
The prisoners housed in these facilities range from newcomers6 to death row inmates9 and are classified at different
security levels. lo

[d. at 1526 (citing Ariz. Admin. Code § R5-1-101(10)).
In Casey, prisoners at an Arizona prison facility also challenged, under the
Rehabilitation Act, the prison policy prohibiting prisoners infected with human
immunodeficiency virus from food service employment. The Ninth Circuit concluded
that the inmates lacked standing to challenge the food service policy. [d. at 1524.
Judge Pregerson concurred in the majority's disposition of this issue. [d. at 1525.
This Note will not address the food service policy.
4. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1520.
5. [d. at 1521-22.
6. See infra note 157 for a discussion on the distinction between a prisoner's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal prosecution and an attorney's assistance in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment.
7. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1518-19 (9th Cir. 1993). The non-contact
visitation policy is implemented in the Special Management Unit [hereinafter
"SMU"J, Cellblock 6 [hereinafter "CB6"), the Alhambra Reception Center, and any
lock-down unit. [d.; see supra note 3 for the relevant part of the challenged policy.
8. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1533. The Alhambra Reception Center houses all incoming
prisoners, including short-timers convicted of non-violent crimes and more dangerous prisoners. [d.
9. [d. CB6 houses approximately 100 inmates, half of whom are sentenced to
death. [d. at 1519.
10. [d. at 1519. When being !:ommitted to a prison, each inmate is rated according to his public risk, institutional risk, medical and health care needs, mental
health needs, educational needs, vocational training needs, work skill needs, alcohoVdrug treatment needs, sex offense treatment needs, and proximity to resident
needs. See ARIZ. DEP'r OF CORRECTIONS, INTERNAL MANAGEMENT POLICY, § 500.1.
Each factor is scored from one to five with the most important needs scored at
five and least important needs at one. [d. Arizona Department of Corrections
[hereinafter "ADOC"J reviews an inmate's classification every six months. [d.
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When visiting with their attorneys at these designated
facilities, prisoners are separated from their attorneys by
cinder-block or glass ll or are confined in a caged area. 12
Attorneys have to confer with their inmate clients through
a telephone, or by shouting through a small hole in the
partition. 13 Documents, not more than two pages at a time,
are exchanged "through a narrow wavy slit. "14 The attorney cannot simultaneously review a document with her
inmate client. 15
In January 1990, twenty-two prisoners, frustrated by
the non-contact visitation policy, initiated a class action l6
against ADOC's agents, officials, and employees for violating
their due process rights of access to the courts under section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code. 17 Attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union (hereinafter
"ACLU") National Prison Project represented the Arizona
prisoners. 18 The district court granted summary judgment

11. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1519. At SMU, a cinder-block or glass partition separates
the prisoners from their attorneys. [d.
12. [d. At CB6, the visiting area for prisoners is approximately seven feet
high, four feet wide, and three feet deep. [d.
13. [d.

14. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1526-27. If more than two pages need to be exchanged, a
guard's assistance is required. [d.
15. [d.

16. The certified class consisted of all adult persons in the custody of the
Arizona Department of Correction at present· or in the future. Casey, 4 F.3d at
1518.
17. Id. The federal statute provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and law, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
To prevail in a section 1983 action, prisoners must show that: (1) prison
officials were acting under color of state law; and (2) the officials' actions or regulations subjected them to a deprivation of a constitutional right. West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
18. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1518. The National Prison Project was formed by the
American Civil Liberties Union in 1972 in the aftermath of the Attica prison riots
tragedy. The Project primarily litigates cases involving adult and juvenile
offenders' Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment and
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in favor of the prisoners and enjoined ADOC from obstructing contact visits between inmates and their attorneys.19
The Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment on
the contact visitation issue and vacated the injunction. 20

III. BACKGROUND
A. PRISONERS' RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution extends due process protection to all persons. 21
Prisoners are included, because "[p]rison walls do not form
a barrier separating prison inmates from the protection of
the Constitution. "22
Historically, however, prisoners have been denied the
rights of ordinary citizens. 23 The recognition that prisoners
retain a residuum of constitutional rights after incarceration
emerged gradually,24 but not without occasional retreat. 25

usually has 20 to 25 cases in progress at any given time. The Project has eight
full·time staff attorneys and is headquartered at 1875 Connecticut Avenue NW,
Suite 410, Washington, DC 20009. The telephone number is 202-234-4830.
19. Casey v. Lewis, 773 F. Supp. 1365 (D. Ariz. 1991). The district court
granted the summary judgment in favor of the prisoners on August 31, 1991 and
amended its memorandum order on September 6, 1991. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1518.
20. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1524-25.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Kwong Rai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 598
n.5 (1953) (the First and Fifth Amendments and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment extend their inalienable privileges to all persons).
22. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). See also Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,
225 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) ("There is no iron
curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country."); id. at
556 ("Prisoners may also claim the protections of the Due Process Clause."); Pell
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (recognizing that prisoners enjoy freedom of
speech and religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (acknowledging that prisoners are protected against invidious discrimination on the basis of race under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
23. See Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871) ("[The
prisoner] has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all
his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to him.").
24. See JIM THOMAS, PRISONER LITIGATION: THE PARADOX OF THE JAILHOUSE
LAWYER, 81-93 (1988) (discussing the emergence of prisoner civil rights and their
development). Acknowledgement of a prisoner's religious freedom presents an ex-
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Right of Meaningful Access to the Courts

Due process of law incorporates "as a corollary the
requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the
courtS."26 As early as 1941, the Supreme Court recognized
that such access rights may not be abridged. 27 In Ex parte
Hull ,28 the Court struck down a prison regulation which
prohibited prisoners from filing an "improperly" drafted
habeas petition as impairment of a prisoner's access to the
courts. 29 The prison's policy authorized parole board officials 'to review all legal documents prepared by inmates
prior to filing with the courts. 3D The Court stressed that
courts had sole power to determine the propriety of a
pleading, prohibiting prison officials from being barriers
between prisoners and the courts. 31
In the 1960s and early 1970s, Supreme Court decisions
characterized prisoners' access rights as fundamental rights.
Consequently, an indigent prisoner's docket fees were
waived when· filing appeals and habeas corpus petitions. 32
Trial records were furnished to prisoners who were unable
ample. In the 1960s, Muslim inmates' request for special dinner house during the
Ramadan fast period did not raise any constitutional issue. Childs v. Pegelow, 321
F.2d 487, 490 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932 (1964). Almost ten years
later, the Supreme Court stated that prisoners shall be afforded opportunities to
exercise their religious freedom. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 & n.2 (1972).
25. Cases from both the Supreme Court and appellate courts in the 1980s
appear to have curtailed prisoners' rights. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 348·50 (1981) (holding that no Eighth Amendment violation resulted from
double-celling inmates in sixty-three-square-foot cells, despite that the doublecelling raised the inmate population above the facility's capacity); Evans v. Johnson, 808 F.2d 1427 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (holding that convicted prisoners
had no absolute constitutional right to family visitation); Jihadd v. O'Brien, 645
F.2d 556, 562 (6th Cir. 1981) (refusing to establish prisoners' constitutional rights
to wear beards on religious grounds). See generally Lance D. Cassak, Hearing the

Cries of Prisoners, The Third Circuit's Treatment of Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 19
SETON HALL L. REV. 526 (1989) for a discussion of the Supreme Court's retreat
from an expansion of the rights of inmates.
26. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974).
27. See Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
28.Id.
29. Id. at 549.
30.Id.
31. Id.
32. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708
(1961).
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to buy them, to safeguard an adequate and effective appea1. 33 Attorneys were appointed to indigent prisoners to
appeal their convictions. 34 Where the state could not provide legal counsel, prisoners were permitted to assist each
other in preparing habeas petitions35 or civil rights complaints. 3s
In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Bounds v. Smith ,37
explicitly stated that prisoners had a constitutional right of
access to the courts. 3S In Bounds, prisoners alleged that
the North Carolina Department of Correction was not
equipped with a legal research facility, thereby violating the
prisoners' Fourteenth Amendment right of access to the
courtS. 39 The prison administration argued that implementing the right of access would create a financial burden. 40
The Court rejected the administration's argument because
"the cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify
its total denial."41 Moreover, the state must "shoulder affirmative obligations to assure" meaningful access. 42 The
Court decided that either "adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law" could
satisfy the fundamental constitutional right of access to the
courtS. 43
However, the Court cautioned that such a decision did
not embody the "full breadth of the right of access" guaran-

33. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477
(1963).
34. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 352, 358 (1963) (deciding the issue under
the Fourteenth Amendment); see also John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228, 233-37 (6th
Cir. 1992) (holding that the state must provide imprisoned juveniles with access to
attorneys in constitutional and section 1983 claims relating to incarceration).
35. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
36. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579-80 (1974).
37. 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977).
38. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821.
39. [d. at 818.
40. [d. at 823.
41. [d. at 825.
42. [d. at 824.
43. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. In Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections,
776 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit held that a prison must provide inmates with access to an adequate law library or, in the alternative, with
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss1/5

6

Hill: Prison Law

1995]

PRISON LAW

7

teed under the Fourteenth Amendment. 44 Access to legal
materials,45 assistance of fellow inmates in preparing a
petition or complaint,46 delivery of legal correspondence,47
receipt of stationery and mailing supplies for preparing and
filing legal documents,48 and access to legal and telephone
directories 49 all signify diverse aspects of the access
right. 50

2.

Attorney-Prisoner Communications As an Aspect of the
Constitutional Rights of Access to the Courts

Communications between an inmate and his legal counsel constitute an important aspect of the right of access to
the courts. 51 Protected attorney-inmate communication includes telephoning the attorney,52 corresponding with the
attorney, 53 and personal meetings with the attorney on
prison premises. 54
In Ching v. Lewis,55 the Ninth Circuit expressly held
that attorney-client contact visitation was included under
the Fourteenth Amendment's right of access to the
courtS. 56 The inmate in Ching was denied contact visits
with his attorney and had to yell through a hole in the
glass partition when conversing with his attorney. 57 He
argued that his right of access to the courts had thus been

Bounds, 430 U.S. at 824.
See Sowell v. Vose, 941 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
See Johnson V. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969).
See Howland V. IGlquist, 833 F.2d 639, 641-42 (7th Cir. 1987).
See Gittens V. Sullivan, 848 F.2d 389, 390 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Jones V.
784 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1986).
49. See Foster V. Basham, 932 F.2d 732, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
50. For a detailed discussion concerning a prisoner's rights of access to the
courts, see MICHAEL MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 11 (2d ed. 1993).
51. Procunier V. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974). See also Dreher V. Sielaff,
636 F.2d 1141, 1146 (7th Cir. 1980). ("An inmate's opportunity to confer with
counsel is a particularly important constitutional right.").
52. See, e.g., Divers V. Dep't of Corrections, 921 F.2d 191, 193-94 (8th Cir.
1990) (per curiam).
53. See, e.g., U.S. V. Stotts, 925 F.2d 83, 87-90 (4th Cir. 1991).
54. See, e.g., Solomon V. Zant, 888 F.2d 1579, 1581-82 (11th Cir. 1989).
55. 895 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1990).
56. Ching, 895 F.2d at 610.
57. Id. at 609.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
Smith,
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violated. 58 The Ninth Circuit cited a Seventh Circuit
case59 and concluded tl:lat a prisoner's opportunity to communicate privately with his attorney exemplified an important part of the constitutionally mandated meaningful access. 60
B.

REASONABLE RESTRICTION OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS

Prison administrators may regulate an inmate's activities "from sundown to sundown, sleeping, walking, speaking,
silent, working, playing, viewing, eating, voiding, reading,
alone, with others.,,61 These regulations can lawfully deprive a prisoner of his right to freedom from confinement,62 but may also unduly infringe upon a prisoner's
retained constitutional rights. 63 Courts will intervene when
the latter happens. 64
1.

Earlier Role of Courts Regarding Prisoners' Complaints

Prior to the civil rights movements of the 1960s, courts
had kept their "hands off" prisoners' complaints. 65 The ju58. ld.
59. Dreher v. Sielaff, 636 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1980).
60. Ching, 895 F.2d at 609-10.
61. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354-55 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citing Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 550 (W.D. Wis. 1972».
Numerous additional activities may be regulated under an individual state's
prison policies. See, e.g., Idaho Dep't of Corrections, Policy and Procedure Manual
. 318-C, Attachment A (1987) (listing 83 prohibited actions, including quitting a
prison job without approval, tattooing, sexual activity, insolence, lying, and trading
property); Indiana Dep't of Corrections, Administrative Procedures, Manual of Policies and Procedures, Admin. Procedures No. 02-02-101, Appendix 1 (1983) (proscribing 80 types of acts, such as rioting, murder, wearing a disguise, creating a
dummy, and being untidy).
62. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980).
63. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-97 (1987) (finding that the
prison regulation violated a prisoner's fundamental right to marry); Cruz v. Beto,
405 U.S. 319, 322 & n.2 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that a prisoner had a limited First Amendment right to free exercise of religion).
64. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974) ("When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will
discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.").
65. Although courts recognized that a prisoner retained certain rights after
incarceration as early as the 1940's, see, e.g., Ex Parte Hall, 312 U.S. 546 (1941),
courts were reluctant to intervene on behalf of prisoners. For a general discussion
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dicial attitude of nonintervention in prison matters is attributable to the system of separation of powers, lack of judicial expertise, and fear of undermining the authority of
correction officers. s6
Courts' attitude toward prisoners' complaints about their
penitentiary conditions started to transpose in the mid1960s. 67 However, the courts offered no elaboration of general guidance for scrutinizing a prison regulation. 68
2.

Wolff v. McDonnell: Development of a "Mutual Accommodation Standard
II

In 1974, in Wolff v. McDonnell,69 the United States
Supreme Court attempted to reach a "mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the
provisions of the Constitution ... of general application."70
Prisoners at a Nebraska facility complained that the revocation of good-time credit71 procedure violated their due process rights, the inmate legal assistance program did not
meet constitutional standards, and the regulations governing
inmates' mail were unconstitutionally restrictive. 72 The
Court was quick to acknowledge a prisoner's entitlement to
constitutional protection73 and his liberty interest in goodof the "hands-oft" doctrine and the demise of the doctrine, see MICHAEL MUSHLIN,
RIGHTS OF PRISONERS §1.02 and § 1.03 (2d ed. 1993).
In Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951), the court rejected an
inmate's challenge of a regulation forbidding inmates from transacting businesses,
because "it [was] well settled that it [was] not the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, but only to deliver from imprisonment those who [were] illegally confined." 1d. at 851-52.
66. See JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 11.4.1 (4th
ed. 1990); see also, Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: a Critique of Judicial
Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L. J. 506 (1963), for a
critique of the hands-off doctrine; JIM THOMAS, PRISONER LITIGATION 86-90 (1988),
for a discussion of the factors accounting for the demise of the hands-off doctrine.
67. See Cassak, supra note 25.
68. 1d.
69. 418 U.S. 539 (1974) .
. 70. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556.
71. "Good time" credit is awarded for good conduct and reduces the period of
sentence that a prisoner must spend in prison although it does not reduce the
period of the sentence itself. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 694 (6th ed. 1990).
72. 1d. at 542-43.
73. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555 (citing Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); Haines
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time credits. 74 But, "some amount of flexibility and accommodation" was necessary75 because of "the nature of the
regime to which [prisoners] have been lawfully committed."76 Consequently, the Court suspended a prisoner's
rights of cross-examination and assistance of counsel at
disciplinary proceedings, in light of the prison's interests in
reducing confrontation between staff and inmate77 and
maintaining the "disciplinary process as a rehabilitation
vehicle. ,,78
Though driving for a "mutual accommodation" between
the institutional needs and prisoners' constitutional rights,
the Court once again failed to intervene on behalf of the
prisoners and left the final decisions "to the sound discretion of the officials of state prisons. ,,79

3.

Turner v. Safley: Adoption of a "Reasonable Relation"
Standard

In 1987, the United States Supreme Court, in Turner v.
Safley,80 granted review of two Missouri prison policies and
established a "reasonableness" standard for reviewing a
challenge of prison regulations. 81
The Turner Court struck· down the Missouri prison's
marriage restriction while upholding the regulation which
barred inmate-to-inmate correspondence. 82 At all Missouri
prisons, inmates were permitted to correspond with other
inmates if the corresponding party was a family member or

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971);
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
(1969); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546
(1964); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945».
74. [d. at 557.
75. [d. at 566.
76. [d. at 556.
77. [d. at 563.
78. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 568.
79. [d. at 569.
80. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
81. Turner, 482 U.S. at 81.
82. [d. at 91.
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if the corresponding subject concerned legal matters.83 Other inmate-to-inmate correspondence was subjected to review
of inmates' behavioral history and psychological state. 54
Also, an inmate could marry only upon demonstration of
"compelling reasons to do SO,,85 and upon "permission of
the superintendent of the prison.,,86
The Supreme Court in Turner began its analysis by
enumerating two fundamental principles. 87 First, since the
prisoners retain certain constitutional rights, they can have
cognizable constitutional claims. 88 Second, courts shall accord deference to prison authorities in prison administration. 89 After reviewing its decisions on prisoners' rights in
the 1970s and early 1980s,90 the Court formulated a standard of review of prisoners' constitutional claims: "when a
prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights,
the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."91
The Supreme Court identified four factors to determine

83. [d. at 81.
84. [d. at 82.
85. [d. Pregnancy and the birth of an illegitimate child have been considered
"compelling reasons" to approve a marriage. [d.
86. Turner, 482 U.S. at 82.
87. [d. at 84.
88. [d.
89. [d. at 84-85.

90. The Court discussed five cases: Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)
(reserving the question of standard of review for prisoners' complaint about mail
censorship-the case turned on the fact that mail censorship restricted a nonprisoner's First Amendment rights of free speech); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974) (holding that the ban on inmates' face-to-face interviews with media was
not unconstitutional in consideration of prison security and noting that judgments
on prison security were within the expertise of the correctional officers and should
have been given deference by the courts); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (finding the regulation concerning prisoner's labor
union activities was reasonably related to the objectives of prison administration);
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (finding a regulation that prohibited prisoners
from receiving hardback books from sources other than publishers, book clubs, or
book stores was a "rational response" to prison security problems); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984) (upholding a policy which denied pretrial detainees
contact visits with family members and friends because prison administrators in
their sound discretion had determined that such visits would jeopardize the
facility's security).
91. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
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the reasonableness of a prison regulation. Courts should
consider (1) whether a "valid, rational connection" exists
between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it;92 (2) whether alternative means for exercising the asserted right remain
available;93 (3) whether accommodation of the asserted
right will adversely affect guards, other inmates, and allocation of prison resources generally;94 and (4) whether there
is an obvious alternative to the regulation which "fully
accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to
valid penological interests."95
Applying these four factors, the Court concluded that
the inmate-to-inmate correspondence regulation was reasonably related to prevention of inmates from communicating
escape plans, plotting violent activities, and organizing prison gangs. 96 Furthermore, Missouri regulation did not deprive a prisoner of all means of communication because it
only limited his correspondence with other inmates. 97 The
alternatives, such as monitoring every piece of inmate mail,
would require "more than de minimis cost. "98
The Turner Court struck down the marriage regulation
which prohibited inmates from marrying unless the prison
superintendent had approved the marriage upon a finding
of compelling reasons for doing SO.99 The Court explained
that an inmate retained her right to marry, even though
such a right was subject to "substantial restrictions."lOO
Prison officials' fear of "love triangles" causing violent con-

92. Id. at 89.
93. Id. at 90.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 90-9l.
96. Turner, 482 U.S. at 91-92.
97. Id. at 92-93.
98. Id. at 93. The Federal Bureau of Prisons has adopted a substantially similar restriction on inmate correspondence. See 28 C.F.R. § 540.17 (1986).
99. Turner, 482 U.S. at 99. The Court noted that regulating marriage may
also entail a consequential restriction on the constitutional rights of non-prisoners.
1d.
100. 1d. at 95 ("[A] prisoner's marriage right is subject to substantial restrictions.").
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frontations,101 and of female prisoners being abused or becoming "overly dependent,"102 represented an "exaggerated
response" to security and rehabilitation concerns. 103
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

In Casey v. Lewis,t°4 the Ninth Circuit followed the
deferential standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley 105 and concluded that the
non-contact visitation policy of the Arizona Department of
Correction106 was constitutional because it was reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests. 107
The Ninth Circuit reiterated its holding from Ching v.
Lewis, 108 that a prisoner's right of meaningful access to
the courts "include[d] contact visitation with his counsel. "109 However, the Ninth Circuit maintained that
Ching's holding merely began the inquiry presented in
Casey: whether the denial of attorney-inmate contact visits
has "unnecessarily"uo abridged a prisoner's meaningful access to the courts. 111 Without elaboration, the Ninth Circuit placed the burden on prisoners to show that the noncontact visitation policy was unreasonable under the Turner
factors. 112
The Ninth Circuit analyzed each Turner factor, emphasizing the prisoners' burden to prove each factor. us . First,
101. [d. at 97-98.
102. [d. at 98.
103. Turner, 482 U.S. at 97-98.
104. 4 F.3d 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (opinion by Farris, J., joined by QQodwin. J.;
partial concurrence and partial dissent by Pregerson, J.).
105. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
106. See supra note 3 for the relevant text of the policy.
107. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1523.
108. 895 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1990).
109. [d.
110. It seems that the Casey majority has used "unnecessarily" and "unreasonably" interchangeably.
111. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1520.
112. [d.
113. [d. The Ninth Circuit maintained that the prison officials should not be
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the Ninth Circuit found a rational relation between the
non-contact visit policy and the prison administration's concerns of escape, assault, hostage-taking, and the introduction of contraband. 114 The court based its finding on a
prison official's belief; 116 a belief to which the court has
accorded "significant" deference. "116
Second, the Ninth Circuit held that the inmates barred
from contact visits "were not denied all means of expression
of their rights of meaningful access,"l17 because "adequate
law libraries" or "adequate assistance from persons trained
in the law" provided them with alternative avenues. 11S
Third, the Ninth Circuit insisted that the inmates produce evidence concerning the impact that accommodations
would have on guards, other inmates, and the allocation of
prison resources. 119
Finally, the prisoners suggested that, as an alternative
to a total ban on contact visits, they be searched before and
after each visit and be observed during the visit. 120 The
Ninth Circuit rejected the proposal because it did not satisfy all of the prison officials' security concerns. 121
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the "rational relation"

placed under "an unduly onerous burden" and that "[a) prison official's concern for
prison security is entitled to significant deference." [d. at 1521.
114. Id.
115. Id. (The prison Warden's testimony "demonstrate[d) his belief that contact
visits between inmates and their attorneys create[d) an intolerable risk of a security breach.").
116. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1521.
117. Id. at 1522 (quotation omitted).
118. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that a triable issue remained as to whether
the inmates' rights of access were satisfied by adequate libraries or other assistance, but refused to remand for trial "because resolution of this factor in favor
the inmates would not alter our ultimate legal conclusion - that the Turner test of
reasonableness is satisfied." Id.
119. Id. at 1522. The Ninth Circuit found no need for remanding for trial on
the issue of impact of accommodation because "the resolution of this factual dispute in favor of the prisoners would not weigh heavily in [its) analysis." Id.
120. Id. at 1523.
. 121. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1523.
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factor of the Turner analysis was determinative. 122 Thus,
the court granted summary judgment for the Arizona Department of Correction, rejecting the claim that triable
issues remained as to the availability of alternative means
of access, the impact of accommodating the contact visits on
prison resources, and the adequacy of the prison's response
to its security concerns. 123
The Ninth Circuit attempted to harmonize its holding
with its prior decision in Ching that a prisoner's right of
access to the courts included contact visitation with his
attorney. It explained that Ching merely demonstrated that
"rational relationship" was a "necessary, though not necessarily sufficient," factor to sustain a prison policy abridging
a prisoners' constitutional rights.,,124
B.

JUDGE PREGERSON'S DISSENT

After depicting in detail the physical condition of noncontact visits at different Arizona facilities, Judge Pregerson
addressed several rationales for his dissent. 125 Judge
Pregerson stated that the majority erred in "allocat[ing] to
the prisoners the burden of disproving the prison officials'
asserted justifications for the policy"126 and in "rush [ing] to
defer to prison officials."127 Additionally, Judge Pregerson
believed that the majority narrowed the right of access to
the courts by holding that prison officials may bar a
prisoner's contact visits with his attorney as long as they
have maintained a well-stocked library.12s

122. [d.
123. [d. at 1523, 1524-25. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, to determine whether genuine issues of material fact existed. [d.
at 1518. The court also reviewed whether the district court had applied the substantive law correctly. [d.
124. [d. at 1523.
125. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1526-27 (9th Cir. 1993) (Pregerson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Pregerson concurred in the majority's
disposition of the policy prohibiting HIV-positive individuals from food-service employment in the prison because the prisoners lacked standing. [d. at 1525.
126. [d. at 1528.
127. [d.
128. [d. at 1528, 1530. Judge Pregerson dissented also because the majority had
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Erroneous Allocation of Burden of Proof

Judge Pregerson challenged the majority's view that the
burden of justifying a prison regulation falls on prisoners,129 and argued that the Ninth Circuit precedent "repeatedly" insisted upon the prison officials to "demonstrate
an adequate justification" for the regulation that implicates
a constitutional guarantee. 1SO
Judge Pregerson noted that although the United States
Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the burden bearing issue,131 the Supreme Court has relied on prison
officials' presentation of evidence to justify a regulation that
injures an inmate's constitutional interests. 132
Judge Pregerson read the two out-of-circuit decisions
cited by the majority as "mischaracteriz[ing] Supreme Court
decisions."133 In Covino v. Patrissi,134 the Second Circuit
quoted a long passage from the Supreme Court's decision in
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,135 to support its assertion
credited unsupported allegations in violation of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1525. Judge Pregerson opposed the majority's
sua sponte grant of summary judgment in favor of prison officials, because he
believed a triable issue of the "actual" reasons for the non-contact policy remained.
Id. at 1540.
129. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1993) (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1528. Judge Pregerson discussed three cases: Walker v. Sumner, 917
F.2d 382, 386 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that prison authorities needed "evidentiary
showing" that the asserted interests were the actual bases for the challenged policy and that the policy was reasonably related to the furtherance of the interests);
Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the prison officials
must produce evidence to justify the challenged policy); Tribble v. Gardner, 860
F.2d 321, 325 n.6 (9th Cir. 1988) (requiring the government to show a rational
relation between the asserted interest and the challenged policy), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1075 (1989).
131. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1528. In Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414 n.12
(1989), the United States Supreme Court expressly reserved comments on the
burden of proof issue.
132. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1529 (discussing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 98 (1987)
and Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989».
133. Id. at 1529-30 (discussing Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, (2d Cir. 1992)
and Abdullah v. Gunter, 949 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1995 (1992».
134. 967 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1992).
135. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
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that the burden fell on the prisoners to justify a prison's
policy.13G Judge Pregerson contended that the O'Lone language did not "absolve the [prison officials] of any burden
of proof."137 Rather, he believed that the language attempted to resolve the issue of how great a burden prison officials should bear.13s
In Abdullah v. Gunter,139 the Eighth Circuit imposed
upon prisoners the burden of justifying a challenged policy.140 Unlike the Second Circuit's reliance on a lengthy
passage, the Eighth circuit rested its decision on a simple
citation to Turner. 141 Judge Pregerson found "nothing at
[the cited page in Turner could] be construed as support for
allocating to prisoners the burden of disproving the state's
justification for a challenged regulation. "142

2.

Departure from Turner's Reasonableness Standard

Judge Pregerson agreed with the majority that the
constitutionality of a prison policy should be tested against
the four factors delineated in Turner. l43 However, he
136. Covino, 967 F.2d at 79. The quoted passage reads:
We think the Court of Appeals decision in this case was
wrong when it established a separate burden on prison
officials to prove that no reasonable method exists by
which prisoners' religious rights can be accommodated
without creating bona fide security problems. Though the
availability of accommodations is relevant to the reasonableness inquiry, we have rejected the notion that prison
officials have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the
claimant's constitutional complaint.
[d.

137. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1530.
138. [d. Judge Pregerson advised that "a close reading demonstrates that
O'Lone merely reiterated Turner's holding that prison officials are not required to
pass the separate 'least restrictive means' test to justify a regulation." [d. (quoting
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1987».
139. 949 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1995 (1992).
140. Abdullah, 949 F.2d at 1035.
141. [d. (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
142. [d. Judge Pregerson mentioned that the Ninth Circuit's approach prior to
this decision was consistent with the Seventh Circuit's holding in Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 598 (7th Cir. 1986) (denying a motion for summary judgment
based on prison officials' conclusory affidavits). Casey, 4 F.3d at 1530 n.4.
143. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1530 (9th Cir. 1993) (Pregerson, J., dissent-
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maintained that by burdenening prisoners with the justification of a regulation and by substituting the attorney-inmate
contact visits with law libraries, the majority "ha[d] , in
effect, abandoned the Turner's reasonableness standard of
review. "144
First, Judge Pregerson criticized the majority's attempt
"to salvage the prison official's case."145 Judge Pregerson
believed the majority's finding of a "rational relation" between the non-contact visit policy and legitimate interests
was not supported by the record,146 logic,147 or common
sense. 148 Emphasizing the distinction between the deference due to prison officials' expertise and their burden to
justify a regulation allegedly in violation of a prisoner's
constitutional rights,149 Judge Pregerson asserted that "deference does not mean abdication."150 Deference came after
the officials had produced actual reasons for implementing a
constitutionally injurious regulation. 151
Second, Judge Pregerson believed that the majority narrowed a prisoner's rights of access to the courts. Correspon-

ing). See al80 supra notes 80-103 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
144. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1525.
145. [d. at 1531.
146. After examining the prison officials' affidavits, Judge Pregerson concluded
that they lacked both specificity and personal knowledge and failed to evidence the
"actual reason for imposing the ban" of contact visits. [d. at 1531-32.
147. Judge Pregerson saw the selection of prison units to implement the policy
as a reflection of its arbitrariness. Those units affected by the policy housed not
only the "most dangerous prisoners in Arizona system" but also prisoners awaiting
to be returned to the community. [d. at 1533. A particular prisoner's security risk
was disregarded. [d.
148. [d. at 1534 ("Common sense tells us that family members are more likely
to pass contraband to a prisoner or aid in a prison escape than are officers of the
court.").
Judge Pregerson also noted that although the barriers were erected between
the prisoners and their attorneys, they were removed when prisoners visited with
their family members and other fellow inmates. For instance, some death-row
inmates at CB6 may have contact visits with families. [d. Prisoners may also be
visited by an inmate legal assistant if they were not so bizarre or hostile to "pose
a threat to the safety of officers or inmates involved." [d. (citing ADOC Internal
Management Policy 302.11 § 6.1.10 (1992».
149. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1535.
150. [d. (citing Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 385-86 (9th Cir. 1990».
151. [d.
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dence, barriered visitation, and non-monitored telephone
calls could not substitute contact visits because it would
make "the most rudimentary of communications become
cumbersome and frustrating."152
However, what was more "startling" to Judge Pregerson
was the majority's holding that "adequate libraries or other
assistance" could substitute an attorney's services. 153 The
historical parameters of the access right and the Supreme
Court's decision in Procunier v. Martinez I54 foreclosed such
a reading of Bounds v. Smith. 155 According to Judge
Pregerson, Bounds imposed the provision of libraries or
legal assistance, in one form or another, as "additional
measures" to assure meaningful access to the courts.156
Judge Pregerson feared that the majority's interpretation of
Bounds, namely that an adequate library would satisfy the
right of access to the courts, may lead to substitution of a
prisoner's Sixth Amendment counseP57 with law books and

152. Id. at 1536-37 (arguing that a contact visit allows attorneys to "assess
their clients' demeanor and credibility, and to establish a rapport with their clients.").
153. Id. at 1537. See also supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Majority's opinion on this issue.
154. 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (invalidating a California prison regulation which
barred law students and paralegals employed by lawyers from visiting their prisoner-clients in spite of the fact that the prison had law libraries and inmate legal
assistance).
155. 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). See also supra notes 37-50 and accompanying
text for a detailed discussion of Bounds v. Smith.
156. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1537-38.
157. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in part,
"[i)n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is limited to criminal prosecutions. Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293, 311-12 (1963).
However our courts have "'constantly emphasized,' habeas corpus and civil
rights actions are of 'fundamental importance . . . in our constitutional scheme'
because they directly protect our most valued rights." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 827
(quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 579 (1974»; see also Raymond Y. Lin, A Prisoner's Constitutional Right to
Attorney Assistance, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1279, 1279 n.6 (1983) (attempting to explain the concept of "attorney assistance" under the constitutionally protected right
of access to the courts); Michael Millemann, Capital Post-Conviction Petitioners'
Right to Counsel: Integrating Access to Court Doctrine and Due Process Principles,
48 MD. L. REV. 455, 472-76 (1989) (discussing attorney assistance in civil cases
under the due process right to access courts).
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prisoner paralegals. 158
Finally, Judge Pregerson contended that the majority
had slighted the prisoners' suggestions in its determination
of no "exaggerated response" to security concerns. 159 Judge
Pregerson recommended that the prison administration
attach a condition based on a prisoner's behavior to the
privilege of contact visits. 160
Ultimately, Judge Pregerson averred that the majority's
position "sets back our constitutional jurisprudence fifty
years. ,,161

v.

CRITIQUE:
PRISONER

AN

UNBEARABLE

BURDEN

FOR A

In Casey v. Lewis,162 the Ninth Circuit raised the issue of whether denial of a prisoner's contact visits with his
attorney violates his Fourteenth Amendment right of meaningful access to the courts. 163 While the Ninth .Circuit
maintained that the right of access to the courts embraces
the attorney-inmate contact visitation,l64 its conclusion that
prisoners bear the burden to establish unreasonableness of
the challenged regulation and that a well-stocked law library may substitute attorney-inmate contact visitation as

158. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1538.
159. [d. In regard to the impact that accomodation of the prisoner's access
rights would have on guards, other prisoners, and prision resources, Judge
Pregerson ascribed the majority's error to its allocation of the burden of proof on
prisoners. [d. at 1539. Prisoners suggested alternatives to a total ban on contact
visits, such as searching the attorney, the prisoner, and the visitation room prior
to all visits; escorting the prisoners to and from the visitation rooms with hands
chained to waists; and having guards observe the visits. [d. They asserted that
these were current security measures for visitation and were ready alternatives to
meet the security concerns asserted by prison officials. [d.
160. [d. at 1540. Such conditions have already been implemented at certain
units. ·Contact visits will be suspended if the prisoner's "behavior is so bizarre or
the inmate's hostility is so extreme that personal contact would pose a threat to
the safety of officers or inmate involved." ADOC Internal Management Policy
302.11 § 6.1.10 (1992).
16l. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1541.
162. 4 F.3d 1516 (9th Cir. 1993).
163. [d. at 1520.
164. [d.
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an alternative access means is very troubling.
A.

WHO SHOULD HAVE THE BURDEN OF JUSTIFYING A
PRISON REGULATION?

The Ninth Circuit held that the inmates bear the burden "to show that the challenged regulation is unreasonable
under Turner."165 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit places a
practically unattainable burden on prisoners to establish
that a prison regulation violates their constitutionally protected rights.
1.

Deference, Not Abdication

Judge Pregerson opens his dissent, in Casey, by addressing the dispute regarding who bears the burden to
justify a prison regulation. 166 The disparity between the
majority and Judge Pregerson may result from equivocal
Supreme Court decisions. Even though it had previously
mandated that prison officials "put forward" legitimate governmental interests to justify their regulations,167 the court
seemed to retract from its position in O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz. l68 It excused the prison officials from "disapproving of the availability of alternatives" fearing that such a
requirement would not "reflect the respect and deference . .. for the judgment of prison administrators."169
However, the O'Lone court did not definitely allocate such a
burden on prisoners. 170 The Supreme Court has reserved
the issue for future discussion.17l
165. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Covino v.
Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1992); Abdullah v. Gunter, 949 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1995 (1992».
166. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1528-30 (9th Cir. 1993) (Pregerson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
168. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
169. [d. at 350.
170. In O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 350, the Court held that the prison officials had no
"separate burden" to "set up and shoot down every conceivable alternative method
of accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint." In applying the Turner
factors, the O'Lone Court relied primarily on the prison officials' testimony to
decide the constitutionality of a challenged regulation. [d. at 351-53.
171. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414 n.12 (1989) (abstaining on the
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Further, although the Supreme Court urges deference to
the opinions of the prison authorities in prison administration,172 it has shown reluctance to rely totally on their discretion. 173 The Court qualified the deference by requiring
that it be "appropriate."174
The Ninth Circuit has allocated to prison officials some
responsibility in vindicating a challenged regulation. In
Walker v. Sumner,175 the Ninth Circuit plainly remarked
that "deference [did] not mean abdication" of prisons' burden to justify their regulations. 176 The court deferred to
the officials' judgment "only after prison officials have put
forth [justification] evidence."177 Otherwise, the "judicial
review of prison policies would not be meaningful."178
2.

A Further Confusion

In addition to. the confusion of who bears the burden of
justifying a prison policy, courts differ as to what proof a
prisoner must offer to demonstrate the unreasonableness of

question raised by the district court's holding that the prison needed to articulate
the relation between its regulation and legitimate penological objectives before the
burden was shifted back to the prisoners to show an "exaggerated response").
172. See O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 353. The O'Lone Court refused to "substitute [its
own] judgement . . . on difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration." Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 588 (1984».
173. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 97-98 (declining to enforce a prison regulation
which offended a prisoner's constitutional rights because the reasons advanced by
the prison were "exaggerated responses" to its concerns).
In the beginning, such reluctance was voiced mostly in dissenting opinions.
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 586 (1974), Justices Marshal and Brennan
discredited the prisons' concern of administrative efficiency as "trivial" when
weighed against prisoners' "fundamental" rights. Justice Douglas, while acknowledging the prisons' security concern was "real and important," opposed granting
"unreviewable discretion" to prison authorities. Id. at 598, 600. Justice Douglas
analogized the placement of inmates' constitutional rights in the hands of the prison administrators to placement of a defendant's rights in the hands of a prosecutor. Id. at 601. Justice Brennan, in O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 367-68, explicitly demanded a "firmer ground" than mere assertions of prison officials for a finding of reasonableness.
174. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349.
175. 917 F.2d 382 (1990).
176. Id. at 385·86.
177. Id. at 386.
178. [d. (citing Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir. 1990».
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a challenged policy. In Pell v. Procunier,179 the Supreme
Court wanted "substantial evidence" to show that the officials had exaggerated their response to security considerations. 180 Some observed the comment in Pell as an imposition of a high burden of proof on prisoners. 181 Others
have interpreted Pell's remarks as a requirement that prisoners must prove the unreasonableness of a prison regulation. 182 Although the majority in Casey did not allude to
Pell or its progeny as authority, it followed them in essence, requiring the prisoners to justify a regulation possibly violative of their constitutional rights. 183
3.

An Impossible Legal Burden

The requirement that prisoners prove the unreasonableness of a prison regulation creates a legal hurdle impossible
for prisoners to overcome. First, inmates are less knowledgeable about the institutional operation~ than their keepers.184 Although the institution may not be physically too
sizable to measure,185 it is "a complex . . . of measures,
all wholly governmental, all wholly performed by agents of
179. 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (upholding prison regulation forbidding media interviews with individual inmates).
180. Id. at 827.
181. See, e.g., Matthew P. Blischak, Note, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz: The
State of Prisoners' Religious Free Exercise Rights, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 453, 462 n.46
(1988) (stating that the Pell opinion implied "a high burden of proof on the prisoners to show that the restrictions were unconstitutional"); Joseph C. Hutchinson,
Analyzing The Religious Free Exercise Rights of Inmates: The Significance of Pell,
Jones, and Wolfish, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 413, 425 (1982-83) (observing that deference to prison officials' judgment resulted in the placement of a high
burden of proof on prisoners in Pell).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Huss, 394 F. Supp. 752, 762, vacated for lack of
jurisdiction, 520 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1975).
183. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit cited
Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1992) and Abdullah v. Gunter, 949 F.2d
1032 (8th Cir. 1991) without paraphrase or discussion. See supra notes 134-42 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these two cases.
184. Courts have repeatedly held that the institutional operations are within
the particular knowledge and expertise of the prison authorities. See Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987); see also Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05
(1974).
185. California has the biggest prison system, which has 8% of the nation's
population and 13% of the country's prison inmates. Sharon LaFraniere, Influx of
Inmates Floods California, THE WASHINGTON POST, April 27, 1991, at A3.
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government, which determine the total existence of certain
human beings. . . ."186 It is a "separate netherworld, driven by its own demands, [and] ordered by its own customs.'H87 A prisoner with a 12th grade education cannot
easily understand and accurately describe the intricacy of a
prison. 188
Second, prisoners can reasonably foresee that living behind bars will inevitably alter virtually every right enjoyed
by a free citizen,189 but may not utterly understand that
the alteration has its boundary and that certain governmental measures have trespassed constitutional boundaries. 19o
Prisoners are expected to obey the institutional measures,
not to reason and test them. 191

186. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354 (1987) (citing Morales v.
Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 550 (W.O. Wis. 1972».
187. Id. One commentator described today's prison as "a policy community within a policy society [which) provides rules and budgets" and analogized the prison
to a corporation, concerned with "the organization of custody." Jonathan A.
Willens, Structure, Content and the Exigencies of War: American Prison Law After
Twenty-Five Years 1962·1987, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 41, 114-115 (1987).
188. Federal Prison Admissions
Education Level
Percentage
8th grade or less
17.0
8th to 11th Grade
28.0
High School Graduate
50.3
Some College
4.7
Other
Less than 0.05%
Median Education
12th Grade
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES OEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, Table 6.86 (1992).
189. See supra note 61 for examples of prison regulations.
190. Two prisoners serving life terms at the Louisiana State Penitentiary spoke
from their experience:
American prisons are filled with people who are poor and
uneducated, with a substantial number being functionally
illiterate. AB a class, prison inmates have very little
knowledge and understanding of law. They perceive it, in
a narrow sense, as the power of the system; a power that
is enforced by the police, prosecutors, and judges. By
perception they understand that the law is applied markedly different to those at the top of the social structure
than to those at the bottom.
Wilbert Rideau & Billy Sinclair, Prisoner Litigation: How it Began in Lauisiana,
45 LA. L. REV. 1061 (1985).
191. Certain prison regulations prohibit prisoners from writing, circulating, or
signing a petition that threatens institutional security, see Idaho Oep't of Correc-
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The court's emphasis on affording substantial deference
to prison officials' assessments of institutional needs and
interests would necessarily place the prisoners at a disadvantage. While the prison officials need not even offer "one
scintilla of evidence" to support their belief that prisoners'
activities would disrupt operation of the prison/92 prisoners must offer "substantial evidence" to demonstrate a deprivation of their constitutional rights. 193
An application of the Turner v. Safley factors places the
problem into sharp focus. 194 Turner first looks at a rational connection between a prison regulation and any legitimate governmental interest. 195 While being governed by
certain regulations, prisoners may be ignorant of the
institution's precise reasons for adopting the regulations. 196
Even if they are informed of the rationale, they cannot
rationalize a regulation which injures their interests. In
contrast, prison officials' perception of the entire operation
enables them to "put forward" government interests to justify the challenged regulation. 197

tions, Policy and Procedure Manual 318-C, Attachment A (1987), and from participation in an unauthorized organization, see OR. ADMIN. R. 291-105-0015, at 3-4
(1989).
"Punishment was at the full discretion of the warden and inmates had no
opportunity to challenge the charges." TODD R. CLEAR & GEORGE F. COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 385 (2d ed. 1990).
192. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, A33 U.S. 119, 127 n.5,
128 (1977). In Jones, the Court deferred to the prison official's opinion that the
exercise of a prisoner's First Amendment right would disrupt prison discipline. [d.
at 128-29. The Court reasoned that requiring a high showing would unnecessarily
burden the operation of the prison. [d. at 128.
The Jones's Court opinion has drawn criticism. See Emily Calhoun, The
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: A Reappraisal, 4
HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219, 220, 234 (1977); see also Comment, The Future of
Prisoners' Unions: Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,
13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 799, 803-04 (1978).
193. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974).
194. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the four
Turner factors.
195. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
196. Prisoners shall be provided with a copy of rules upon entry to the institution. AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, § 23-3.1
(1983).
197. See Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1990); see also supra
notes 184-87 and accompanying text describing the prisoners' disadvantage in
challenging a prison regulation.
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Turner next considers the alternative means of exercising the impaired right. 198 As the Casey v. Lewis court
maintained, no dispute arises as long as the inmates are
"not denied all means" of access. 199 Thus, a prisoner who
questions the non-contact visitation policy must predict and
assess the "alternative avenues" the prison officials will
submit. Because of the prison officials' expertise ,200 the
court's substantial deference to the prison official's opinions,201 and the prisoners' lack of information,202 the prisoner can hardly prevail. 203

Third, a determination of the reasonableness of a regulation requires an assessment of the "ripple effect" on prison personnel and resources. 204 It is hard to imagine that a
prisoner can appraise prison resources, let alone their proper allocation. The availability and allocation of prison personnel and resources are well within the jurisdiction of
prison administration. 205
The final factor of Turner examines whether the regulation is an "exaggerated response" to prison concerns. 206

198. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
199. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1522 (9th Cir. 1993).
200. See supra note 184 for a list of three Supreme Court cases which have
recognized prison officials' expertise in their institutional operations.
201. See supra note 172 for an example of the Supreme Court's deference to
prison authorities.
202. See supra notes 184-91 describing an average prisoner's disadvantage in
dealing with the legal system.
203. In 1990, federal prisoners filed 999 civil rights petitions and state prisoners filed 25,043 in the United States District Courts. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEn OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS,
Table 5.76 (1992).
In 1991, 4,655 prisoners filed their appeals in the United
States Courts of Appeals. [d. at Table 5.78.
According to a Harvard study, nearly all prisoners' cases are terminated
before any pretrial conference. Fewer than 5% reach the trial stage. William B.
Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoners § 1983 Suits in the Federal
Courts, 92 HARv. L. REV. 610, 618 (1979).
The author is not unmindful of the expertise of the prisoners' counsel. However, a large percentage of prisoner civil rights lawsuits proceeds pro se. [d.
204. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
205. [d. at 84-85 ("Running a prison is an inordinarily difficult undertaking that
requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources and all of which are
peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government.").
206. Id. at 90-91.
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Turner discharges the officials' duty to "shoot down every
conceivable alternative method," and charges the inmate
claimants to suggest an alternative that fully accommodates
the prisoner's right at de minimis cost.207 However, this
places an unattainable burden on prisoners, for officials
may refute the suggestions by enumerating other security
concerns or technical problems not within the realm of
prisoners' knowledge. This is what happened in Casey v.
Lewis. 208 The prisoners there suggested, as an acceptable
alternative, body searches after contact visits accompanied
by a guard's observation during the visits. 209 However, in
the Ninth Circuit's view, they satisfied some, but not all, of
the prison officials' security concerns. 210 Some of the alternatives, such as body searches, may overstep other constitutional boundaries. 211
4.

The Proposed Solution: A Possible Legal Burden and An
Affirmative Defense

In a prisoner's action under section 1983,212 instead of
proving deprivation of a constitutional right by disproving
the reasonableness of a prison regulation,213 prisoners
should simply be required to introduce facts of the officials'
impropriety, sufficient to create a factual question or a
prima facie case of deprivation. 214 The burden should shift
to the government when the prisoners discharge their duty.
Defense of the challenged prison regulation or action should

207. [d. at 91.
208. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1532.
209. [d.
210. [d.
211. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979) (permitting prison officials to
conduct body cavity searches of prisoners after contact visits with persons outside
the prison, but emphasizing that the searches must be conducted in a reasonable
manner); see also Sims v. Brierton, 500 F. Supp. 813, 817 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (recognizing that the body cavity search, the most intrusive and humiliating search, had
the effect of discouraging a prisoner from having visits with his lawyer).
212. See supra note 17 for the text of section 1983 and the requirements to
establish a section 1983 claim.
213. See Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993).
214. This accords with certain Circuit Courts' treatment of pleading a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION
1983: CLAIMS, DEFENSES, AND FEES § 1.6 (2d ed. 1992).
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rest with the prison officials who can best argue its reasonableness. 215
Such an allocation of the burden of proof balances: (1)
the prisoners' dilemma;216 (2) the fear of the "minor" prison claims' flooding the judicial system;217 and (3) the
courts' deference to the opinions of prison officials. Since
the prisoners are only burdened with the factual proof of a
constitutional violation, they will not be forced to rationalize
a regulation which they believe injures their constitutional
interests. Without such factual proof, the court may grant a
judgment for prison officials. 218
A requirement that officials affirmatively defend a challenged regulation accords with the court's emphasis of affording deference to the prison officials' judgment. The defense provides the prison officials with an opportunity to
recapitulate and reconsider the reasons for enacting the
challenged regulation. This serves as a check on discretion
vested in prison officials. 219

215. Cf, Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 512 F.2d 527, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding the burden of proof often falls on the party who "has particular knowledge or
control of the evidence as to such matter"), reversed on other grounds, 426 U.S.
290 (1975); Trans-American Van Service, Inc. v. United States, 421 F. Supp. 308,
330 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (reasoning that once the applicant for a common carrier has
proven a prima facie case, the existing carrier opposing the application has the
burden of proving such application should be denied, for the "capability of protesting carrier are matters peculiarly within their knowledge").
216. See supra notes 182-93 and accompanying text discribing the prisoner's
dilemma.
217. Chief Justice Burger of the United States Supreme Court once stated that
"[fJederal judges should not be dealing with prisoner complaints which, although
important to a prisoner; are so minor that any well-run institution should be able
to resolve them fairly without resorting to federal judges." JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS, § 11.4.1 (4th ed. 1991) (citing 62 AMERICAN
BAR AsSOCIATION JOURNAL 189 (Feb. 1976».
218. The "judgment" refers to any "decree and any order from which an appeal
lies." FED. R. CN. P. 54 (examples include judgments on the pleadings, under FED.
R. CN. P. 12, and summary judgments, under FED. R. ClV. P. 56).
219. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 598 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Justice Douglas dissented from the Court's position that the prisoners' exercise of
a fundamental constitutional rights should be left within the unreviewable discretion of prison authorities.
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B. WHAT IS THE VALUE OF AsSISTANCE OF COUNSEL?

Rights of meaningful access to the courts ensure the
prisoners with a forum to air their grievances. 22o Assistance of a legal counseJ221 facilitates a more efficient and
skillful handling of their complaints and assures inmates of
fair treatment and "protection of our most valued
rights. "222 The Ninth Circuit discounts the significance of
counsel's assistance when it equates an attorney's service
with the presence of a law library and tolerates a physical
barrier between an attorney and her inmate client during
consultation.
1.

From a Prisoner's Perspective: An Empty Promise

In Bounds v. Smith,223 the Supreme Court made a
sweeping promise: "prisoners have a constitutional right of
access to the courts. "224 The Court further mandated that
the access be meaningful 225 and the prison authorities ensure a prisoner's "meaningful access.,,226 Maintaining a law
library may meet the "meaningful access" mandate. 227 So
may the establishment of some legal assistance programs,
like:
[T]raining of inmates as paralegal assistants
to work under lawyers' supervision, the use of
paraprofessionals and law students, either as
volunteers or in formal clinical programs, the
organization of volunteer attorneys through

220. See supra note 157 for a discussion on counsel's assistance in prisoner's
civil lawsuits.
221. See Raymond Y. Lin, Note, A Prisoner's Constitutional Right to Attorney
Assistance, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1279, 1286 (1983).
222. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827, 831 (1977). See supra notes 51-60 and
accompanying text for a discussion on communication between attorneys and their
prisoner-clients as an aspect of the constitutional rights of access to the courts.
223. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
224. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821.
225. ld.
226. ld. at 828.
227. ld.; cf. Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
library with insufficient books or an insufficient allowance for research does not
provide "meaningful" access).
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bar association or other groups, the hiring of
lawyers on a part-time consultant basis, and
the use of full-time staff attorneys, working
either in new prison legal assistance organizations or as part of public defender or legal
services or offices. 228

However, what makes a particular legal access program
constitutionally adequate is unclear from the Bounds decision. 229 The Casey court's assertion that an adequate library would solve the problem of inadequate attorney
assistance,230 fails to further the inquiry left unsolved by
Bounds. 231
In Ching v. Lewis,232 the Ninth Circuit considered the
issue of adequate legal assistance in the context of personal
visits between attorneys and inmates. 233 The court held
that the visits must be "contact" to guarantee a private
communication between an attorney and her inmate client. 234 Although the Casey court paid lip service to Ching,
it questioned the reasonableness of permitting contact visits235 on prison premises and eventually denied the prisoners contact visits. 236 As Judge Pregerson declared, the
court's tolerance of a barrier between attorneys and inmates
"has in effect drawn an iron curtain between prisoners and

228. [d. at 831.
229. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832 ("[A) legal access program need not include any
particular element we have discussed and we encourage local experimentation. Any
plan, however, must be evaluated as a whole to ascertain its compliance with con·
stitutional standard."}; see also Lin, supra note 223, at 1285-86 ("Although Bounds
seemed to hold that the prisoner's right of access was adequately safeguarded by
the provision of a law library, the issue of whether attorney assistance would be
required as an adjunct to the library was not before the court. Therefore, Bounds
alone cannot resolve the issue of whether the provision of law libraries without
attorneys is constitutionally sufficient."); Millemann, supra note 159, at 467.
230. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1522.
231. ADOC apparently provided attorneys to assist inmates' in accessing the
courts. In Casey, the prisoners challenged the inadequacy of the attorney's assistance because of the denial of contact visits. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1518.
232. 895 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1990).
233. Ching, 896 F.2d 608; see also supra notes 55·60 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Ching.
234. Ching, 895 F.2d at 609.
235. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1520.
236. [d. at 1523-24.
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the Constitution."237
2.

From an Attorney's Perspective: A Frustrating Experience

In the dim visitation room,23S the attorney is separated
from her client by a cinder-block or glass partition. 239 One
attorney's summary of her experience best illustrates the
frustration:
[T]he steel mesh barrier between the attorney
and her client prevents much of the subtle but
important non-verbal or confidential interactions that attorneys normally rely on during
depositions. The attorney is unable to see her
client's expressions through the grate, and
therefore does not know whether his silences
are the result of some confusion, lack of memory, or simply because he never heard her
questions. 24o

When conversing with her client, the attorney has to
shout through a hole or a "telephone attached to the wall
farthest away from the partition."241 No conversations are
private. 242 Confidential communication represents the core
of an attorney-client relationship, because it encourages "full
and frank communications between attorneys and their clients," promotes observance of law, and aids the administration of justice. 243 To a prisoner behind high walls, his at-

237. [d. at 1525 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 538, 555-56 (1974».
238. One of the regulation-affected units has only one light on the attorney's
side of the partition. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993).
239. [d. at 1518-19.
240. [d. at 1536.
241. [d. at 1526.
242. [d. Some of the ADOC staff testified that they had overheard the attorneyprison conversation taking place inside the visitation rooms while outside the room.
Casey, 4 F.3d at 1527. This was true even when the prisoners and attorneys were
using moderate voice tones. [d.
243. Commodity Futures Trading Com'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985).
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice mandate that "[a) communication not
otherwise subject to reading or hearing should not be intercepted except pursuant
to a court order, or unless authorized by law, when the communication is reasonably anticipated to be a prisoner and his or her attorney." ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 23-6.l(d)(i). Although it is unclear whether ABA standards for
Criminal Justice govern an attorney's assistance in the context of a civil lawsuit,
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torney may be his only "access" to the courts and the
society.244 With a prison authority standing in a close proximity and possibly overhearing the conversations between
the attorney and her client, no "full and frank" exchanges
between attorneys and clients will occur.245 This creates "a
chilling effect on attorney-client communications"246 and inevitably impedes effective legal representation. 247
VI. CONCLUSION
Casey v. Lewis248 places an unbearable burden on prisoners who challenge a prison regulation violative of their
constitutional rights. Consequently, barriers as the one in
Casey will forever stand. New barriers will be erected. Today, a barrier has separated prisoners from their attorneys.
Tomorrow, another barrier will separate them from another
constitutional protection. As Judge Pregerson warned, barrier
by barrier, our constitutional jurisprudence will be set back
another 50 years. 249

federal standards promulgated by the Department of Justice, clearly enunciate a
prisoner's counsel rights in a civil lawsuit. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL STANDARDS
FOR PRISONS AND JAIL § 1.04 (1980). Each facility develops and implements policies
and procedures to ensure the right of inmates to have access to legal assistance in
civil or criminal matters through counsel and their authorized representatives, or
designated counsel substitutes. ld. Correctional authorities facilitate access to such
assistance, including assisting inmates in making confidential contact with attorneys and their authorized representative. ld.
244. See Turner, supra note 203, at 624-25 ("It is apparent that it is futile for
prisoners to proceed pro se. ").
245. People v. Barraza, 218 Cal. App. 3d 700, 705 (1990).
246. ld.
247. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1537 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
248. 4 F.3d, 1516, 1526 (9th Cir. 1993).
249. ld. at 1541.
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